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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 12-1246 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
IRVINE HODGE, JR.,  
Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the District Court 
of the Virgin Islands 
District Court No. 3-99-cr-00006-002 
District Judge: The Honorable Anne E. Thompson 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
December 7, 2012 
 
Before: SMITH, HARDIMAN, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: December 20, 2012) 
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION 
_____________________ 
      
SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
 In April 2000, Irvine Hodge, Jr., and his younger brother, Devin Hodge, 
accepted a “package” plea deal and pleaded guilty to murdering the owner of a 
jewelry store in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(j)(1).  The package plea agreement 
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provided that the government would make “no specific sentencing 
recommendation other than to request that the sentence be within the guideline 
range.”  Thereafter, the District Court held a joint hearing and sentenced both 
Irvine and Devin to life imprisonment.  Devin argued on direct appeal that the 
government had breached its plea agreement at sentencing by implicitly requesting 
a life sentence.  United States v. Devin Hodge, 412 F.3d 479, 484 (3d Cir. 2005).  
We agreed, vacated Devin’s sentence, and remanded the matter to the District 
Court to determine whether it should grant specific performance of the plea 
agreement or allow withdrawal of the guilty plea.  Id. at 486-87. 
 Irvine failed to file a notice of appeal, but he did seek collateral relief under 
28 U.S.C. § 2255, raising the same argument put forth by his brother.  We 
concluded that Irvine demonstrated cause and prejudice for the failure to file a 
direct appeal.  United States v. Irvine Hodge, 554 F.3d 372, 379 (3d Cir. 2009).  As 
a remedy, we vacated his sentence, remanded Irvine’s case to the District Court, 
and instructed the District Court to re-enter the same sentence so that Irvine could 
file a timely direct appeal.  Id. at 382. 
 On remand, the District Court re-imposed Irvine’s life sentence.  This time, 
Irvine filed a timely appeal, raising the argument that his brother Devin had 
successfully pressed.  We agreed that the government had treated Irvine in the 
same manner as it had treated Devin.  United States v. Irvine Hodge, 389 F. App’x 
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96, 102 (3d Cir. 2010).  Accordingly, we determined that the government had 
breached its package plea agreement with Irvine just as we had held on Devin’s 
direct appeal.  Likewise, we vacated Irvine’s life sentence and remanded the case 
to the District Court to determine whether to order specific performance of the 
package plea agreement or to allow Irvine’s withdrawal of his guilty plea.  Id. at 
104. 
 In the meantime, Devin Hodge withdrew his guilty plea, and entered a 
second guilty plea pursuant to a new plea agreement.  The District Court imposed a 
sentence of 450 months of imprisonment.  See Devin Hodge v. United States, 276 
F. App’x 120, 121 (3d Cir. 2008).   
 Irvine sought the same treatment that his brother Devin had received.  On 
remand, Irvine filed a motion seeking to withdraw his guilty plea.  See Def.’s Mot. 
Withdraw, United States v. Irvine Hodge, No. 3:99-cr-06-2 (D.V.I. May 4, 2011, 
2011), ECF No. 278.  At a hearing on the motion, Irvine renewed his request to 
withdraw his guilty plea.  In response, the government acknowledged that some 
deference should be given to the defendant’s choice of remedy.  But the 
government emphasized that the defendant’s choice was not absolute.  It explained 
the difficulty that would arise if the case proceeded to trial because the victim’s 
wife, a second victim of the shooting, and an eyewitness were no longer residing in 
the Virgin Islands.  The District Judge, who had not presided over this prosecution 
4 
 
in the first instance, asked if Irvine had confessed during the earlier proceeding.  
The government advised that Irvine had not confessed, but that he had made a 
statement at the change of plea proceeding.  The government further noted that the 
Third Circuit had not found any deficiency in the plea proceeding and that Irvine 
had not asserted his innocence since his life sentence was vacated.   
 Defense counsel advised that Irvine still wanted to withdraw his guilty plea.  
After a brief recess, counsel pointed out that the District Judge had presided over 
Devin’s case on remand and had determined that the appropriate remedy in 
Devin’s case was to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea.  In light of that, Irvine’s 
counsel urged the District Judge to permit Irvine to likewise withdraw his guilty 
plea.  But, as the government rejoined, there was already a new plea agreement 
between the parties in Devin’s case.   
 The District Judge acknowledged that she had presided over Devin’s case on 
remand.  Although she was unable to recall the exact sequence of events, she was 
aware that Devin had not sought a new trial, but only to avoid a life sentence. 
 Before ruling on Irvine’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the District 
Judge appropriately noted the applicable legal authority in Santobello v. New York, 
404 U.S. 257, 263 (1971), and United States v. Moscahlaidis, 868 F.2d 1357, 1363 
(3d Cir. 1989), and that it is the trial court that must determine whether to remedy 
the government’s breach of a plea agreement by requiring specific performance of 
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the plea agreement or by allowing the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea.  
Irvine, the District Judge observed, had fired the fatal close-range shot to the store 
owner’s head and pleaded guilty.  Yet he sought to withdraw his plea, not because 
of a defect in that change of plea proceeding, but because of the error that occurred 
at sentencing.  In light of the circumstances, the Court concluded that specific 
performance was the appropriate remedy.   
 Santobello instructs that the specific performance remedy requires assigning 
the matter to a new judge for resentencing.  404 U.S. at 263.  Because the District 
Judge had not imposed the original sentence on the brothers, the parties agreed to 
have the District Judge impose Irvine’s new sentence.   
 At resentencing, Irvine objected only to a minor item in the presentence 
report that is not material to this appeal.  Irvine’s offense level of 40 and criminal 
history category of II yielded a guideline range of 324 to 405 months.  After 
hearing argument on the 18 U.S.C. § 3553 sentencing factors and noting that the 
guidelines were only advisory, the Court imposed an above-guidelines sentence of 
410 months of imprisonment.  It explained that the sentence reflected Irvine’s 
greater culpability as the “trigger man.”  In addition, the Court directed that his 
sentence be served concurrently with a separate sentence for an earlier robbery of 
the same jewelry store.  Subsequently, the Court issued an amended judgment, 
changing Irvine’s term of imprisonment from 410 months to 405 months.   
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 A timely appeal followed.
1
  Defense counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders 
v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), contending that there were no nonfrivolous 
issues to present on appeal.  After setting forth an overview of the facts and the 
procedural history, counsel noted that the only issue he could present on appeal 
was that the District Court erred by concluding that specific performance of the 
plea agreement was the appropriate remedy for the government’s breach of the 
plea agreement.  Counsel correctly noted that, under Santobello, it is the trial court 
that must exercise discretion in selecting the remedy for the government’s breach 
of the plea agreement.  404 U.S. at 263.  Under the circumstances and in light of 
the deferential standard of review, counsel concluded that the issue of whether the 
Court had abused its discretion in ordering specific performance was frivolous.  
 In accordance with Third Circuit L.A.R. 109.2(a), the Clerk advised Irvine 
that he could submit a pro se brief.  Irvine did so, and he argued that the District 
Judge erred by deciding that specific performance was the appropriate remedy.  He 
faulted the District Judge for relying on her memory of what occurred on remand 
with his brother Devin’s case.  He asserted that the District Judge’s recollection 
was incorrect and that his brother had been allowed to withdraw his plea.  Irvine 
stated that his case should be remanded so he could withdraw his plea just as his 
                                                 
1
 The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 48 U.S.C. § 1612 and 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 
3742(a). 
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brother Devin had done.   
 When counsel submits an Anders brief, our inquiry is “twofold:” (1) whether 
counsel adequately fulfilled the requirements of Anders; and (2) “whether an 
independent review of the record presents any nonfrivolous issues.”  United States 
v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Marvin, 211 
F.3d 778, 780 (3d Cir. 2000)).  For that reason, we consider whether counsel has 
adequately examined the record in search of appealable issues and whether he has 
sufficiently “explain[ed] why the issues are frivolous.”  Id. (citing Marvin, 211 
F.3d at 780). 
 We are mindful of Irvine’s contention that the District Judge erred by 
relying on her recollection because it was incorrect.  The Judge’s recollection, 
however, was not erroneous with respect to Devin’s intention to maintain his plea 
of guilty.  Because the parties had already resolved the approach they would take 
on remand in Devin’s case, the District Judge did not have to weigh the 
circumstances and determine the appropriate remedy for the government’s breach 
of the plea agreement.  As a consequence, the course taken in Devin’s case was not 
instructive.  
 Here, the record demonstrates that there was no agreement between the 
parties regarding how to proceed on remand.  Furthermore, it appeared to the 
District Judge that Irvine wanted to withdraw his guilty plea in order to proceed to 
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trial.  The Judge appropriately considered the lack of any deficiency in the change 
of plea proceeding and the extent of Irvine’s culpability for the crime to which he 
pleaded guilty.  In concluding that specific performance was the appropriate 
remedy, the District Judge adhered to our instructions in the mandate, took account 
of all of the circumstances, considered the consequences of the two remedies, and 
exercised her discretion by requiring specific performance of the plea agreement to 
murder.  Therefore, the District Judge did not abuse her discretion by ordering 
specific performance.
2
  
 In sum, we conclude that Irvine’s counsel fulfilled his obligation of 
examining the record in search of appealable issues.  Because our independent 
review has not revealed any issue of arguable merit, we will affirm the judgment of 
the District Court.  We also grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.  Furthermore, we 
certify that the issue presented in the appeal lacks legal merit and does not require 
counsel to file a petition for a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme 
Court. 
 
                                                 
2
  Neither Irvine nor his counsel challenged his sentence.  His counsel noted that 
the sentence was within the guidelines range.  Our independent review of the 
record fails to reveal any basis to argue that the sentence was either procedurally or 
substantively unreasonable.  
 
